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COMMENTS
TITLE VII AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),' arbitration
has become a means to settle disputes in a speedy, efficient, and inexpensive
manner.2 However, controversy has arisen in attempting to reconcile the FAA
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.3 The legislative history behind the FAA
and Title VII are in direct conflict.4 Federal substantive law requires "a court to
resolve any doubts regarding arbitrability in favor of arbitration."5 It is also
well-established that Congress intended the courts to "exercise final responsibil-
ity for the enforcement of Title VII."L As such, the purposes of the two Acts
are in direct opposition.
Two Supreme Court cases have discussed the issue of arbitration dealing
1. 9 U.S.C. § 1-14, 201-08 (1987).
2. The FAA was enacted in an attempt to relieve some of the congestion in the court system while at
the same time providing a means to provide a quick, inexpensive, and just resolution to the claims of litigants.
See United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 597 P.2d 290 (N. Mex. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911
(1979). See also Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1994)
(citing Peterson v. ShearsonfAm. Express, 849 F.2d 464, 465 (10th Cir. 1988)), which stated "there is a strong
federal policy encouraging the expeditious and inexpensive resolution of disputes through arbitration." Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1994).
4. See Mark T. Conlon, Comment, Employment Law-Arbitration Not a Prerequisite to a Federal
Court, 24 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 271 (1990).
5. Id. at 273 (referring to Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (Arbitration Act establishes body of federal substantive law favoring arbitration.)). In addition, "[i]t has
been held that the Federal Arbitration Act evidences a strong federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements." United Nuclear Corp., 597 P.2d at 299.
6. Conlon, supra note 4, at 277. Additionally, the Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., stated:
Moreover, the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual
to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.
The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws
and institutions relating to employment discrimination.
415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1973).
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with statutory claims in employment cases.' Although Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.' dealt specifically with a Title VII claim, the main issue centered
around the arbitration of the claim in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement.9 In addition, this case was not decided under the FAA 0 Accord-
ingly, after this case it was unclear whether arbitration of a Title VII claim
would be enforceable absent a collective bargaining agreement." The second
case, Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane Corp., decided under the FAA, 2 held
an Age Discrimination in Employment ("ADEA") claim was subject to manda-
tory arbitration. 3 Although this case has been applied to numerous Title VII
cases, 4 Gilmer can be distinguished from Title VII cases because the legisla-
tive history of Title VII reveals a policy against binding arbitration."5 The leg-
islative history behind the ADEA reveals no such policy against binding arbitra-
tion. 6 The policy regarding binding arbitration in Title VII cases, however, is
in direct conflict with the FAA. The FAA, 9 U.S.C. Section 1 et seq., directs
the Courts to "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."'7
7. See id. at 36; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
8. Alexander, 415 U.S. 36.
9. See id. at 39.
10. See Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST.
Louis U. LJ. 77, 79 (1996).
11. Brian K. Van Engen, Note, Post-Gilmer Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The Expansion of
Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort to Reverse the Trend, 21 J. CORP.
L. 391, 398 (1996).
12. Malin, supra note 10, at 79.
13. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
14. See e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994);
Rojas v. TK Communications Inc.,87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996).
15. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I) at 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635 states as follows:
Section 216 encourages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution to resolve disputes arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section 621 et seq., where appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law. These methods include settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilita-
tion, mediation, factfinding, mini-trials and arbitration. This section is intended to encourage alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution that are already authorized by law.
The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is in-
tended to supplement, not supplant the remedies provided by Title VIL Thus, for example, the Com-
mittee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of
a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected per-
son from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (I).
16. Although Gilmer raised numerous arguments in an attempt to persuade the Court that Congress in-
tended to "preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue," he was unable to do so.
Malin, supra note 10, at 80 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). Even though the Court agreed the ADEA
furthered important public policies, it "concluded that there was no tension between those policies and en-
forcement of the agreement to arbitrate as long as Gilmer could vindicate his statutory rights in the arbitral
forum." Id.
17. Lang v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (D.Minn. 1993) (quoting Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahom, 482 U.S. 220, 226) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
221 (1983)); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 482-84; Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The Act also states arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1987).
A minority of the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") have attempt-
ed to state that employment contracts are adhesion contracts and would be invalid under 9 U.S.C. § 2 because
the employee has no bargaining power. See, e.g., EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, Case No. H-
95-755 (D.C.S.D. Tex. 1995). In fact, in April 1995, the EEOC commissioners met to discuss the alternative
dispute resolution conflicts. Although they were in favor of voluntary alternative dispute resolution, they
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss2/8
1997] TITE VII AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
This Comment will distinguish and reconcile the case law and legislative
intent behind Title VII 5 claims and the FAA offering a proposal as to various
approaches should Title VII claims be subject to mandatory arbitration or
should they not be subject to mandatory arbitration. This author believes they
should be subject to mandatory arbitration as long as the claimant "knowingly"
enters into the arbitration agreement. 9
II. HISTORY
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In this case, Petitioner, Harrell Alexander, Sr., an African American male,
was hired by Gardner-Denver Company to perform maintenance work.e He
was then promoted to a drill operator trainee.2' Subsequently, he was dis-
charged from his position for "producing too many defective or unusable parts
that had to be scrapped." He brought a grievance under a collective bargain-
ing agreement for unjust discharges as well as a Title VII action in federal
court for racial discrimination.24 The company argued the Title VII action was
included the following:
1. The commission is opposed to arbitration agreements that mandate binding arbitration of em-
ployment discrimination disputes as a condition of initial or continued employment, and
2. The commission will receive and process charges regardless of the existence of any such manda-
tory arbitration agreement and regardless of the existence of any employer-sponsored ADR program.
Can Employers Mandate Arbitration of Discrimination Claims? 77e EEOC Says "No", OKLA. EMP. LAW
LM-tR (Doemer, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, Tulsa, Okla.), Oct. 1995, at 1.
However, many of the courts have determined that arbitration agreements are not adhesion contracts,
nor are they unfair to the employee. See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Mason, 87 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.
1996), holding an arbitration procedure in the employee handbook is not an unconscionable adhesion contract
See also, Gilmer, holding challenges to the adequacy of arbitration procedures are insufficient to preclude
arbitration. Thus, the court did not feel arbitration was unfair. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
18. Although this paper discusses the controversy in the context of Title VII cases, the same controversy
exists under the American With Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The ADA has substantially the same language in
its legislative history as does Title VII. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(1) at 76-77 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,499-500:
This section encourages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution where appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law. These methods include settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation,
mediation, factfmding, mini-trials and arbitration.
This amendment was adopted to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution that are already
authorized by law. The Committee wishes to emphasize, however, that the use of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by this Act.
Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitra-
tion, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does
not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of this Act.
This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, whose remedial provisions are incorporated by reference in title .The Committee believes that
the approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. applies equally
to the ADA and does not intend that the inclusion of Section 513 be used to preclude rights and
remedies that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities.
Id.
19. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
20. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38 (1973).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id at 39.
24. See id. at 42.
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subject to compulsory arbitration.' The employee contended he had a right to
have his claim adjudicated in a judicial forum.'
The district court granted Gardner-Denver Company's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the complaint. The district court determined the is-
sue of racial discrimination had been raised during the arbitration and resolved
adversely to petitioner.' Accordingly, the lower court held "that petitioner,
having voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance to final arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement, was bound by
the arbitral decision and thereby precluded from suing his employer under Title
VII. '29 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion."
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision.3' The main fact
upon which the Court premised its decision was the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement.32 The Court gave several reasons why an arbitration
clause could not be enforced in the context of a collective bargaining agreement
in Title VII cases.33 First, "the arbitrator.., has no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties." '34 Therefore, if
the arbitrator looked outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement to
make his decision (i.e., to the statutes), he would be exceeding his scope of
authority, and the award would not be enforceable.35
In addition, even if the collective bargaining agreement contained a provi-
sion including Title VII in its scope, it would still be invalid. 6 In coming to
this result, the Court looked at the legislative intent behind Title VW17 and stat-
ed: "Congress intended for federal courts to exercise final responsibility for
Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal."3
The Court also considered the waiver issue and differentiated the waiver of an
individual's rights with that of the majority's rights.39 A union bargains on
behalf of the majority and, in doing so, could bargain away an individual's
statutory rights if the majority would gain a benefit, i.e., higher wages or more
benefits.' Title VII "concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's
rights to equal employment opportunities."'
25. See id. at 43.
26. See Id. at 36.
27. See id. at 43.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
31. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 43 (1973).
32. See id. at 49.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 53.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 56.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1) at 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635.
38. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56 (1973).
39. See id. at 51.
40. See id.
41. Id.
4
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Aside from the collective bargaining agreement, the Court included strong
language which left the impression that a Title VII case could not be subject to
arbitration even if a collective bargaining agreement were not involved. The
Court began by stating the provisions of Title VII "make plain that federal
courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance with Title
VII"' The Court went on to assert "that there can be no prospective waiver of
an employee's rights under Title VII." ' 3 As stated earlier, the Court also con-
sidered the intent of Congress and determined arbitration would be inconsistent
with the goal of the federal courts having the final responsibility in the enforce-
ment of Title VII." Another factor the Court noted was that the arbitrator
lacked expertise in the area of Title VII. The Court expounded by stating:
Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and
judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations. On
the other hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a
primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved
especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language
frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law con-
cepts.45
Obviously, the Court felt arbitrators were in no way qualified to determine
disputes involving Title VII claims. However, in light of the Court's thoughts
on arbitration, a key point to note about this case is that it was not decided
uider the FAA.' As will be discussed more fully below, the purpose of the
FAA and the legislative history of Title VII are in direct conflict.47
B. Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane Corp.'s
Gilmer was a securities representative.49 As a condition of his employ-
ment, he was required to register with the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE").se His agreement with the NYSE required that any dispute be sub-
ject to arbitration. Gilmer was terminated at the age of 62.52 Gilmer brought
42. Id. at 45.
43. Id. at 51.
44. See id. at 56.
45. Id. at 57.
46. See Malm, supra note 10, at 79. See also, Engen, supra note 11, at 398.
47. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I)(1991).
48. The Gilmer case deals with an ADEA claim, not a Title VII claim. As noted in Gilrer, the ADEA
has no legislative history which would "preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements." 500 U.S. 20, 24
(1991). As previously noted, Title VII has specific language in its legislative history which precludes binding
arbitration. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1). However, although the Gilrer case can definitely be distinguished
from a case involving Title VII, numerous cases have relied on Gilmer's reasoning as support for the conten-
tion that arbitration clauses are enforceable in Title VII cases. See e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir.
1996). Accordingly, the Gilmer case will be discussed at length throughout this article.
49. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
50. See id.
51. See id. In his registration application he "'agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy'
arising between him and Interstate 'that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of
the organization with which I register."' Id. In this regard, NYSE Rule 347 "provides for arbitration of '[a]ny
controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the
19971
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suit in federal court based on the ADEA 3 In response, Interstate filed a mo-
tion to compel arbitration based upon Gilmer's registration application and the
FAA. Based on Alexander, the District Court denied Interstate's motion."
The Fourth Circuit reversed," and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Gilmer Court first considered the FAA in making its decision The
FAA states:
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract 8
As Gilmer noted, "[tihese provisions manifest a 'liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements."'59 Based on this liberal policy, the Court held it was
clear "that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, en-
forceable pursuant to the FAA."
Another issue discussed in dicta in this decision was based upon whether
the FAA included employment agreements. If so, would the agreement in this
case be an employment agreement excluded under the provisions of Section 1
of the FAA?6' However, the Court did not address the issue of whether an
employment agreement would fall within the parameters of Section 1 of the
FAA, because it determined the agreement in question was not an employment
contract, but rather a registration application with a securities commission.62
Since this decision, many commentators, as well as the EEOC, have ar-
gued employees are losing substantive rights through arbitration of statutory
claims.' However, the Gilmer Court disagreed and stated "[b]y agreeing to
employment or termination of employment of such registered."' Id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 24.
54. See id.
55. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (1991). The District Court concluded that "Congress intended to protect
ADEA claimants from the waiver of a judicial forum." Id.
56. See id. The Fifth Circuit held "nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the
ADEA indicat[ed] a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements." Id. It should be
noted that the legislative history of the ADEA and the legislative history of Title VII are clearly not the same.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
57. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
58. Id. at 24-25 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1987)).
59. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983)).
60. Id. at 26.
61. In a footnote, the Gilmer Court noted that several amici curiae briefs had been filed contending the
FAA does not apply to employment contracts. Section 1 of the FAA provides that "nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1987). Although this argument has been hotly debated and
will be discussed in detail later in this comment, the Gilmer Court held "it would be inappropriate to address
the scope of the §1 exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract
of employment." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2 (1991). The Court stated that the agreement was a securities
registration application, not an employment agreement. Id. at 36. However, the dissent disagreed. The dissent
stated the FAA intended to exclude all employment contracts and found that this was an employment agree-
ment. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 38-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
63. See Cliff Palefsky, The Founders Would Frown on Mandatory ADR, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMEINT
[Vol. 33:665
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arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial forum." Many arguments were brought up by Gilmer in an effort to
persuade the Court that he would lose rights if his dispute were arbitrated.'s
He argued arbitration panels are biased,' discovery in arbitration is more lim-
ited,67 arbitration does not require written opinions,s arbitration procedures
do not provide for broad equitable relief and class actions,69 and there is "un-
equal bargaining between the employers and employees." '7
The Court addressed each of Gilmer's contentions. First, the Court was not
persuaded that the arbitrators would be biased in the arbitral forum.1 Howev-
er, in this specific instance the NYSE arbitration rules provide protection
against biased panels. 2 In reference to Gilmer's discovery argument, the Court
held he failed to show any more extensive discovery was required for an ADEA
claim than other claims the Court had formerly held arbitrable.73 However,
again in this specific instance, the NYSE arbitration rules provide for extensive
discovery procedures.74 As to the lack of written opinions, the NYSE arbitra-
tion rules require a written opinion which is to be made available to the pub-
lic.75 The Court found Gilmer's argument that arbitration does not provide for
equitable relief completely inaccurate.76 The Court also found an arbitration of
an individual's claim does not preclude class-wide action by the EEOC. Al-
though the Court agreed there may be unequal bargaining power between the
employer and employee, it held "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power... is
not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable
in the employment context."'TI
The Gilmer Court distinguished its opinion from Alexander. First, it point-
ed out that a collective bargaining agreement was involved in that case.79 In
DISCRIMINATION CASES: 1996, at 541 (Nancy E. Smith ed., 1996); Report and Recommendations of the
Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, in LIrIGATING EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMI-
NATION CASES: 1996, at 549 (Nancy E. Smith ed., 1994); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution Policy Statement, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES: 1996, at
563 (Nancy E. Smith ed., 1995); EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging, 67 FEP 1243 (S.D.Tex. 1995).
64. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
65. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 31.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 32.
70. Id. at 33.
71. See id. at 30. The Court stated "[wie decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral
body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial
arbitrators." (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985)).
72. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (1991).
73. See id, at 31.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 31-32.
76. See id. at 32. The Court held "arbitrators do have the power to fashion equitable relief." Id.
77. See id.
78. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
79. See id. at 34.
1997]
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addition, the Court noted that Alexander was not decided under the FAA.'e
The Gilmer Court did not overrule Alexander but rather distinguished its deci-
sion." However, several courts have interpreted Gilmer as overruling Alex-
ander in its entirety.'
I. LEGISLATION
A. The FAA
The FAA was enacted for the purpose of moving the "parties to an arbitra-
ble dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possi-
ble."83 The FAA "evidences a strong federal policy favoring the enforcement
of arbitration agreements." Section 2 of the FAA "is a congressional declara-
tion of a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements ... ."' The much con-
tested debate, however, is over Section 1 of the FAA.86 Many have argued this
Section excludes all employment contracts.' "Read narrowly, the exclusion
refers only to employees involved in actual interstate transportation. Read
broadly, the exclusion encompasses all employees involved in interstate com-
80. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (1991).
81. The Gilmer Court recognized the fact that Alexander involved a collective bargaining agreement.
Therefore, the Court expressed the differences between that case and the case before them. See id. at 33-34.
82. See Malin, supra note 10, at 84. Malin noted the Fourth Circuit has read Gilmer as overruling
Gardner-Denver in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996). See also,
Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482; Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87
F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
83. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1982).
84. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.,597 P.2d 290 (N.M. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 911
(1979). See also, Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1984). The Court in
Mitsubishi Motors stated:
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration .... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concern-
ing the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability.
Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25).
85. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982). Section 2 of the FAA provides as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitra-
tion an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of
any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1987)(emphasis added).
86. 9 U.S.C. Section 1 provides as follows:
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading water carriers, agree-
ments relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collision, or any other
matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would b embraced within admiral-
ty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein defined means commerce among the several States or with
foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between
any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or Territory or foreign
nation, but nothing herein shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1987)(emphasis added).
87. Malin, supra note 10 at 88.
8
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merce."5 Although the courts are split on this subject,89 the definite trend is
that the exclusion be read narrowly.'
The leading case on this issue is Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio
& Mach. Workers of Am.9 This case involved a cbntroversy between a manu-
facturing corporation and its labor union.' The Court attempted to determine
the meaning Congress intended behind the phrase "workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce. ' 3 The question presented was whether "it intended to
include only those employees actually engaged in the channels of interstate or
foreign commerce or did it comprehend all those engaged in activities affecting
such commerce, such as the production of goods destined for sale in it."94 The
Court looked to the legislative history behind Section 1 of the FAA9 and de-
termined since both classes of workers excluded, seaman and railroad employ-
ees,9 were "engaged directly in interstate or foreign commerce,"'9 "only
those other classes of workers who are actually engaged in the movement of
interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in
practical effect part of it" 8 should be included in the Section 1 exclusion."
The courts have gone to great lengths to interpret Section 1 narrowly."°
The most far-reaching case is Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp."°' In this
case, the plaintiff was a stockroom warehouseman "which received and sent
goods from and into interstate commerce.""I°2 Although this court found that
the plaintiff had a "strong, close, and rather immediate contact" with those
involved in interstate commerce, he was not directly involved in the transporta-
tion business. 3 Obviously, this court read the Section 1 exclusion very nar-
rowly. In discussing the exclusion, the court did address the broad interpretation
that the defendant thought should be used by acknowledging that "if Congress
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See e.g., Tenney Eng'g Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir.
1953); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984); Kropfelder v.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952 (D.Md. 1994). All of these cases held that the Section 1 exclusion of
the FAA was limited to workers employed in the transportation industries.
91. Tenney Eng'g Inc., 207 F.2d at 450.
92. See id. at 451.
93. Id. at 452.
94. Id.
95. The Court cited a report of the American Bar Association in which it was stated:
Objections to the bill were urged by Mr. Andrew Furuseth as representing the Seamen's Union, Mr.
Furuseth taking the position that seamen's wages came within admiralty jurisdiction and should not
be subject to an agreement to arbitrate. In order to eliminate this opposition, the committee consented
to an amendment to Section 1 as follows: 'but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce.'
Id. at 452 (citing 48 A.B.A. REP. 287 (1923)).
96. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1987).
97. Tenney Eng'g Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450, 452 (1953).
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Malin, supra note 10, at 89-90.
101. Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952 (D.Md. 1994).
102. Id. at 952.
103. Id. at 958.
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had wanted to excluded [sic] all employment contracts from the Act, it could
simply have said 'employment contracts' and left it at that.""'°4 The case law is
clear that the majority of the circuits which have decided this issue are in agree-
ment that Section 1 of the FAA excludes "only contracts of employment for
workers 'actually in the transportation industries"' or engaged in the actual
movement of goods in interstate commerce."5
Once it is established that a case falls within the scope of the FAA, the
instructions of the FAA are clear. The FAA provides "an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."'" The
next major controversy arises within this section. Although there is no problem
with any interpretation of this section, the controversy arises when trying to
apply this section to Title VII cases."°c Accordingly, the next section will dis-
cuss the legislative intent behind Title VII in regard to arbitration in an attempt
to reconcile it with the FAA.
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Congress enacted Title VII to promote equality in the workplace."°8 Title
VII makes unlawful discriminatory employment practices based on an
individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'"o It is also unlaw-
ful under Title VII to discriminate against an employee for opposing unlawful
employment practices."0 The intent of the act to dispose of discriminatory
104. Id. at 956.
105. Hampton v. 1TT Corp., 829 F. Supp. 202, 203 (S.D.Tex. 1993). In agreement with this analysis are
the Second, Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits. See id. The cases include Signal-Stat Corp. v. United Elec.
Radio & Mach. Workers, 235 F.2d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. den., 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Erving v. Va.
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local
Union No.'9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Tenney Eng'g Inc. v.
United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953).
106. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1987).
107. Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1676 (1996).
Although this article refers to the contradictions between the FAA and ADA, the analogy is the same in that
the ADA and Title VII has substantially the same legislative history in this regard.
108. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). That section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fall or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges, of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994). That section provides:
(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceed-
ings.
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employ-
ees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member
thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employ-
10
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practices is clear on its face. "Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., to assure equality of employment op-
portunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the
basis of race, color religion, sex, or national origin.' In addition, "Congress
indicated that it considered the policy against discrimination to be of the 'high-
est priority.'.. 2 However, what is not clear on its face is whether a claim
brought under this act is subject to mandatory arbitration under the FAA."'
As stated above, Congress did not include an express provision under Title
VII to exclude mandatory arbitration.1 4 However, it is very clear from the
legislative history of Title VII that even though Congress was in favor of volun-
tary alternative dispute resolution methods, it had no intent for arbitration of
Title VII claims to be mandatory." 5 This intent is established in a house re-
port which provided in pertinent part:
[The use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to
supplement, not supplant the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, the
Committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbi-
tration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in
an employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seek-
ing relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VU."6
This policy against mandatory arbitration clearly contradicts the liberal policy
favoring arbitration under the FAA."7
The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in dicta, but not directly."'
As discussed earlier, in Alexander, the Court discussed the issue of arbitration
in the context of Title VII extensively. The Court recognized the legislative
history behind Title VI." 9 It also focused on the important purpose of Title
VII and stated "that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final responsi-
bility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be in-
consistent with that goal.' '""°
The Court further expanded on other reasons for not upholding mandatory
arbitration agreements in Title VII cases. First, the Court pointed out that most
arbitrators are not familiar with the law and their competence is specialized in
the "law of the shop, not the law of the land.'' For this reason, the Court
ment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceedings, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994).
111. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)), and Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-430.
112. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
113. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1994).
114. See id. See also, Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47.
115. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
118. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
119. See Alexander, 415 U.S. 36 at 48.
120. Id. at 56.
121. Id. at 57.
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stated "the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsi-
bility of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with
respect to Title VII.'
The Court then attacked the arbitration procedure." It focused on the
factfinding process and stated this process in an arbitration procedure was not
equivalent to the process in a judicial proceeding.'24 The factf'mding process
during arbitration is not as complete because "the usual rules of evidence do not
apply; and the rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often
severely limited or unavailable."' "as The Court recognized that it was the infor-
mality of arbitration that makes it an "efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution,"' "a but pointed out that "[t]his same characteris-
tic... makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title
VII issues than federal courts."'2
The Court did consider a deferral rule" which would allow deferral of
the matter to the arbitration. However, the Court felt that to adhere to a stan-
dard which protected the policies and rights behind Title VII would "make
arbitration a procedurally complex, expensive, and time-consuming pro-
cess."'2 9 The Court further stated "enforcement of such a standard would al-
most require courts to make de novo determinations of the employees'
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 58 (quoting Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)).
126. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974).
127. Id. In addition, the Court stated:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a
comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII. mhe spe-
cialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land.... Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment con-
cerning the demands and norms of industrial relations. On the other hand, the resolution of statutory
or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved
especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning
only by reference to public law concepts.
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfimding. The
record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and
rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examina-
tion, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. And as this Court has rec-
ognized, "[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award."
Malin, supra note 10, at 79 n.6 (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-68 (citations and footnotes omitted)).
128. The deferral rule was set forth in Rios v. Reynolds Metal Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972). It was an
attempt to provide a means to defer Title VII cases to mandatory arbitration in a fair manner. The deferral
rules provided the following:
First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitrator unless the contractual right coincides
with rights under Title VII. Second, it must be plain that the arbitrator's decision is in no way viola-
tive of the private rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor of the public policy which inheres in Title VII.
In addition, before deferring, the district court must be satisfied that (1) the factual issues before it
are identical to those decided by the arbitrator, (2) the arbitrator had power under the collective
agreement to decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence presented at the arbitral
hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4) the arbitrator actually decided the factual issues
presented to the court; (5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural infir-
mities. The burden of proof in establishing these conditions of limitation will be upon the respondent
as distinguished from the claimant.
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58-59 n.20.
129. Id. at 59.
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claims."' As such, the Court was uncertain "whether any minimal savings in
judicial time and expense would justify the risk to vindication of Title VII
rights."'' The Court also feared such a deferral rule would adversely affect
the arbitration system.
III. THE STATUS OF THE ISSUE
A. The Status of the Issue After Alexander but Prior to Gilmer
After Alexander, almost all of the courts relied on the dicta in Alexander to
deny mandatory arbitration in Title VII cases.' One of the leading cases after
Alexander was Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc.'34 The Eighth
Circuit adhered to the Supreme Court's findings as to the legislative intent of
Title VII and the problems which would be involved by submitting Title VII
claims to mandatory arbitration. 3 In addition, this court "concluded that arbi-
tration under the FAA was not intended to supersede federal judicial remedies
under Title VII." 36 Based on this language, it is obvious that although there is
a conflict between the legislative history of Title VII and the FAA, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals found Title VII should supersede the FAA. 37
In Utley v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,3' the First Circuit also relied heavily
on Alexander in holding an employee is not required to submit a Title VII
claim to binding arbitration.'39 The defendant in that case urged the Court to
at least require arbitration prior to allowing the plaintiff to proceed in a judicial
forum." This court not only relied on Alexander, but further expounded on
constitutional guarantees by stating "that Title VII 'contained an express private
right of action .... and involved adjudication of the rights of an individual
under the constitution, an inquiry that, with all due respect to arbitration, has
historically been the sole province of Article nI adjudication.''
In addition to the First and Eighth Circuits, many of the district courts
have also relied on Alexander to find arbitration agreements in Title VII cases
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See Bierdeman v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 211 (N.D.Cal. 1990); Borenstein v.
Tucker & R.L. Day, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 3 (D.Conn. 1991); Jacobsen v. T Fin. Serv. Corp., 762 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.Tenn. 1991); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (lst Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Management
Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988).
134. Swenson, 858 F.2d 1304.
135. See id. at 1307.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. Utley, 883 F.2d 184 (1989).
139. See Utley, 883 F.2d at 185.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 187 (quoting Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook, and Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 297
(lst Cir. 1986)).
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unenforceable. In Borenstein v. Tucker & R.L. Day, Inc.,'42 the court held
"there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title
VII" '43 At the time of this decision, the Fourth Circuit had held in favor of
arbitration in the context of an ADEA.'" Although, this court disagreed with
the Fourth Circuit, it also distinguished Gilmer.45 The court found the arbitra-
tion procedures of the Securities Exchange Commission were very extensive to
ensure the adequacy of arbitration procedures."4 The court noted, however,
that those safeguards were lacking in most Title VII cases.47
Another district court case decided after the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Gilmer but prior to the Supreme Court's decision is Bierdeman v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc." In that case, the court distinguished Gilmer by stating
that the reasoning behind Gilmer would not apply to Title VII claims because
the legislative intent behind Title VII was different from that of the ADEA.'49
The court recognized the legislative intent behind Title VII which would pre-
clude arbitration.'
B. The Status of the Issue After Gilmer
Although a few district courts have distinguished Gilmer and held against
binding arbitration in Title VII cases,' the majority of the circuit courts and
district courts have relied on Gilmer as authority for allowing binding arbitra-
tion in Title VII cases.'
142. Borenstein, 757 F. Supp. 3.
143. Id. at 4 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1973)).
144. See id. at 4.
145. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990).
146. See Borenstein, 757 F. Supp. at 5.
147. See id. The court noted the factors against arbitration in the context of a Title VII claim:
First, arbitral boards do not have the power to award broad equitable relief which courts have under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). They cannot, for example, enjoin employers from engaging in future acts of
discrimination. The power of the arbitrators is limited solely to the parties and the grievances before
them. Thus, arbitration would not satisfy the policy concerns behind the Title VII legislation. Further,
no statutory provision gives the EEOC the power to affect the arbitration procedure. In this respect it
is unlike the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") referred to by the courts in Shearson and
Gilmer. While the SEC has been given expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration
procedures employed by the self-regulatory agencies such as the national securities associations, no
such power has been given to the EEOC.
Id. at 5-6 (citations omitted).
148. Bierdeman v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 211 (N.D.Cal. 1990).
149. See id. at 214.
150. See id. The court stated-
For example, in Gilmer, the Fourth Circuit noted that an arbitration agreement would be unenforce-
able where "Congress has evinced an intent to preclude waiver of the judicial forum for a particular
statutory right." 895 F.2d at 197 (4th Cir. 1990). While the Fourth Circuit found no indication of
such Congressional intention with respect to ADEA, the Supreme Court found that such intention
exists with respect to Title VII claims. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1973).
Thus, we do not find the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gilmer persuasive on the question of whether
arbitration of Title VII claims should be compelled.
151. See, e.g., Tarrant v. UPS, Inc., 1994 WL 30552 (N.D.1l. 1994); EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging, 67
FEP Cases 1243 (S.D.Tex. 1995).
152. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1992); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d (10th Cir. 1994).
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Probably the most important case since Gilmer and the most indicative of
the Supreme Court's view on this issue is Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Alford 3 The reason this case is so significant is that it was originally decid-
ed by the Fifth Circuit prior to Gilmer."4 In that case, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined, based on Alexander, that a Title VII claim could not be subject to bind-
ing arbitration. 55 Dean Witter subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for
Certiorari.'" The Court granted certiorari and remanded the case back to the
Fifth Circuit "for further consideration in light of Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson
Lane Corporation."'
57
On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that "Gilmer requires us to reverse the
district court and compel arbitration of Alford's Title VII claim."'' s Although,
as discussed previously, some courts distinguished Gilmer from Title VII cases
because it involved an ADEA claim, the Fifth Circuit held Title VII and the
ADEA were both civil rights statutes and were both enforced by the EEOC. 9
Thus, they had "little trouble concluding that Title VII claims [could] be sub-
jected to compulsory arbitration."' "W The Fifth Circuit stated that the policy
arguments in Alexander were rejected by Gilmer.6 '
The Fifth Circuit more recently again held arbitration agreements enforce-
able in Title VII cases in Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc. 2 Here the plain-
tiff attempted to assert different arguments than those asserted in the previous
cases. First, the plaintiff contended his employment agreement was excluded
from the FAA. 63 However, the court rejected this argument and stated Con-
gress did not intend to exclude all employment agreements under the FAA."
The plaintiff also contended that the contract was unconscionable." The
Court stated this was an attack on the entire agreement, not on the arbitration
clause itself and, must therefore be heard by an arbitrator." It is clear from a
reading of this case that the Fifth Circuit favors binding arbitration in Title VII
153. Alford, 939 F.2d 229.
154. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990).
155. See id. at 105.
156. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., v. Alford, 500 U.S. 930 (1991).
157. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 500 U.S. at 930.
158. Alford, 939 F.2d at 229-30.
159. See id. at 230.
160. Id.
161. Alford, 939 F.2d at 230. The Court stated specifically:
Any broad public policy arguments against such a conclusion were necessarily rejected by Gilmer.
Our prior decision stemmed mainly from our reading of the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co ... which held that "federal courts have been as signed plena-
ry powers to secure compliance with Title VII" and that "[t]here is no suggestion in the statutory
scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an Individual's right to sue or divests federal
courts of jurisdiction.
Id. (quoting Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court further stated
"[t]his rejection of Alexander is especially forceful because the stockbroker-employee in Gilmer 'vigorously
asserte[d]" that Alexander 'preclude[d] arbitration of employment discrimination claims."... Moreover,
Gilmer rejected Alexander's mistrust of the arbitral process."' ld.
162. Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996).
163. See id. at 747.
164. See id. at 748.
165. See id. at 749.
166. See id.
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cases.
The Ninth Circuit has also addressed the issue of binding arbitration in
Title VII cases. In Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,67 the court also
followed Gilmer in holding Title VII cases to be subject to binding arbitra-
tion."t The court stated Mago had the burden of showing "that Congress in-
tended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at is-
sue."' The court concluded Mago had not met this burden. It is unclear from
the text whether Mago submitted the legislative history of Title VII previously
discussed, 70 since the legislative history of Title VII is not discussed in the
text.
Although the Ninth Circuit has held in favor of arbitration in Title VII
cases,' it has also held in Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, the employee
must knowingly forego statutory remedies."r The plaintiff signed a U-4 form
containing an agreement "to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that...
is required to be under the rules, constitutions, or bylaws of the organizations
with which I register."' The court held this provision could not in itself bind
a plaintiff to arbitrate any particular dispute.' The key factor to note about
this case is that it did discuss the legislative history behind Title VIIV' 5 In do-
ing so, the court found there was a "congressional concern" that Title VII dis-
putes be arbitrated only "where appropriate," and only when such a procedure
was knowingly accepted." 76 The court stated "[tihis is a policy that is at least
as strong as our public policy in favor of arbitration."'" Thus, the court con-
cluded "that a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to forego her statutory
remedies and arbitrate her claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit such
disputes to arbitration."'78 Although this court did not specifically state that
the arbitration clause must refer to Title VII cases, it left the impression that it
would be wise to do so. 7
9
167. Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
168. See id. at 935.
169. Id. The court stated that "if such an intention exists, it will be deductible from the text of Title VII,
its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the underlying purposes of Title VII."
Id.
170. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
171. See Mago, 956 F.2d at 932.
172. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994).
173. Id. at 1301.
174. See id. at 1302.
175. See id. at 1304-05.
176. Id. at 1305.
177. Id.
178. Id. The court reasoned:
Although the Supreme Court has pointed out that plaintiffs who arbitrate their statutory claims do not
'forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute,' ... the remedies and procedural protections
available in the arbitral forum can differ significantly from those contemplated by the legislature. In
the sexual harassment context, these procedural protections may be particularly significant.
Id.
179. See id. In regard to this particular contract, the court stated:
In this case, even assuming that appellants were aware of the nature of the U-4 form, they could not
have understood that in signing it, they were agreeing to arbitrate sexual discrimination suits. The U-
4 form did not purport to describe the types of disputes that were to be subjected to arbitration.
Moreover, even if appellants had signed a contract containing the NASD arbitration clause, it would
[Vol. 33:665
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IV. ALTERNATIVES
Arbitrability of Title VII claims is an issue the Supreme Court needs to
decide. There are several ways the Court could rule. As stated in many of the
pre-Gilmer decisions, the Court could easily hold the legislative history of Title
VII't0 precludes arbitration. In ruling against arbitration, however, the Court
may be denying claimants a more favorable forum to adjudicate their claim.
Arbitration has become a means to settle disputes in a speedy, efficient, and
inexpensive manner,' and this forum may be more favorable to some claim-
ants.'8
As previously discussed, the Court could adopt some type of deferral rule.
One deferral rule was discussed in the Alexander case. Under the deferral rule,
the contractual rights must coincide with the rights under Title VII, and the
decision must not violate the rights guaranteed by Title VII. In addition, the
Court must be satisfied that the issues before the Court were identical to those
before the arbitrator, the arbitrator had the power to decide the issue, the evi-
dence adequately dealt with the factual issues, the arbitrator decided the factual
issues before the Court, and the arbitration proceeding was fair."s
The Dunlop Commission suggested that arbitration systems should meet
"six key quality standards:"'"5
[A] neutral arbitrator who knows the laws in question and understands the
concerns of the parties; [A] fair and simple method by which the employ-
er and employee can secure the necessary information to present his or
her claim; [A] fair method of cost-sharing between the employer and
employee to ensure affordable access to the system for all employees;
[The right to independent representation if the employee wants it; [A]
range of remedies equal to those available through litigation; A written
opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for the result; and Suffi-
cient judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent with the gov-
erning laws. 6
Although a deferral rule may seem the way to go, there are disadvantages.
A deferral rule could easily turn the arbitration system into a second court sys-
not put them on notice they were bound to arbitrate Title VII claims.
Id.
180. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
182. As the Dunlop Commission noted, arbitration may be more favorable to litigation because:
[T]he pursuit of a legal claim through litigation often proves stressful and unsatisfying. Overburdened
federal and state judicial dockets mean that years often pass before an aggrieved employee is able to
present his or her claim in court. The combative nature of litigation tends to push the employee to the
sidelines in this legal struggle, though occasionally subjecting employees to detailed investigation of
their personal histories and character.
The Report and Recommendations of the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela-
tions, supra note 63 at 553.
183. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
185. The Report and Recommendations of the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations, supra note 63, at 554.
186. Id. at 558.
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tem." In Alexander, the Court discussed the disadvantages of a deferral rule.
The Court stated "a standard that adequately insured effectuation of Title VII
rights in the arbitral forum would tend to make arbitration a procedurally com-
plex, expensive, and time consuming process." ' The Court also pointed out
that enforcement of a deferral rule "would almost require courts to make de
novo determinations of the employees' claims.' 89
The Court could also decide with the post-Gilmer decisions that Title VII
claims are subject to binding arbitration."9 However, in doing so the Court
would be ignoring the clear legislative intent regarding arbitration in Title VII
cases.
19 1
The most logical decision for the Court would be to adopt the holding of
the Ninth Circuit in Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai. The Court should
allow binding arbitration only in cases in which the claimant knowingly enters
into an arbitration agreement."9 Although the Ninth Circuit did not specifi-
cally address what would constitute "knowingly," the Supreme Court should
find an arbitration agreement binding only in cases in which the agreement
specifically refers to arbitration of Title VII claims."9 If the Supreme Court
were to follow the Ninth Circuit, the aims of the FAA'94 would be met and
claimants would have the right to decide the most favorable forum in which to
present their claims. 95
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court needs to grant certiorari to decide the fate of arbitra-
tion in the context of Title VII cases. The best route would be to adopt the
Ninth Circuit's view and allow arbitration of Title VII disputes as long as the
claimant knowingly enters into the agreement."
Monica L. Goodman
187. See id.
188. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1973).
189. Id. The Court further stated "it is uncertain whether any minimal savings in judicial time and ex-
pense would justify the risk to vindication of Title VII rights. I.
190. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1991); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994).
191. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
192. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 42 F.3d at 1301.
193. The court concluded that this arbitration agreement was not specific enough in that the claimant did
not understand what she was agreeing to arbitrate. See id. at 1305. However, this court did not elaborate on
what type of language should be included in a valid arbitration agreement. The court did specifically note
there was nothing in the arbitration clause which communicated to the claimant that she was agreeing to arbi-
trate a Title VII claim. Id. Thus, the decision could be read as requiring arbitration clauses to specifically
include language alerting claimants that they agree to arbitrate any and all claims under Title VII.
194. See supra notes 83 and 84 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 192-93 and accompanying text.
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